Cyber Jihadism: An Analysis on How the Cyber Sphere Has Altered Islamic Terrorism by Spangenberg, Simon
Butler Journal of Undergraduate Research 
Volume 6 
2020 
Cyber Jihadism: An Analysis on How the Cyber Sphere Has 
Altered Islamic Terrorism 
Simon Spangenberg 
University of New Mexico 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/bjur 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, Business Commons, Education Commons, Life Sciences 
Commons, Medicine and Health Sciences Commons, Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons, and 
the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Spangenberg, Simon (2020) "Cyber Jihadism: An Analysis on How the Cyber Sphere Has Altered Islamic 
Terrorism," Butler Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 6, Article 9. Retrieved from: 
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/bjur/vol6/iss1/21 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Scholarship at Digital Commons @ 
Butler University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Butler Journal of Undergraduate Research by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@butler.edu. 








CYBER JIHADISM: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW THE 
CYBERSPHERE HAS ALTERED ISLAMIC TERRORISM 
 
SIMON SPANGENBERG, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO 
MENTOR: MARIE VASEK 
 
Between 2011 and 2015, more than 30,000 foreigners, including more than 
4,000 Westerners, have joined the ranks of ISIS in the Syrian conflict (Schmitt & 
Sengupta, 2015). Between 2000 and 2018, 91% of the total victims of terror attacks 
in Europe were accounted for by Islamic terrorists, causing a total of 753 fatalities 
in that time frame (Le Figaro, 2019). Numerous studies have statistically 
demonstrated a continuous surge of new recruits in Islamic terrorist groups such as 
ISIS since the beginning of the millennium. Carter, Maher, and Neumann (2014) 
attribute this trend to the expansion of technological possibilities in the 
cybersphere. They claim that the conflict in Syria is arguably one of the first live-
documented conflicts on social media and video streaming platforms: “In the minds 
of the foreign fighters, social media is no longer virtual: it has become an essential 
facet of what happens on the ground” (Carter et al., 2014, p. 1). Propaganda and 
recruitment encompass only a portion of the online Islamic extremism threat, 
however. Training also represents a significant role that Islamic terrorism has on 
the cybersphere (Pawlak, 2015). Digital tools are increasingly used to train foreign 
recruits. This is most prominently illustrated by the Al-Qaeda-created online 
magazine Inspire, which led to the making of two bombs that killed three and 
injured approximately 300 in the Boston Marathon in April 2015 (Lemieux, 
Brachman, Levitt & Wood, 2014). In this paper, we review and analyze the three 
above-mentioned major components of online Jihad: propaganda, recruitment, and 
training. Through related work, we propose a formal description and explanation 
for the reasons of past superiority of online Islamic terrorism.  
The fight against Islamic terrorism is extremely complex and requires 
historical understanding of the roots of current conflicts in the Middle East. 
Understanding why new recruits join the ranks of Islamic terrorist groups is crucial 
for efficiently fighting online terrorism (Rosenblatt, 2019); thus, we provide a brief 
historical review of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the emergence of 
radical groups.  
Although fighting online terrorism is often neglected, the need to do so is at 
an all-time high. Overlooking this necessity has undeniably contributed to the 








recent surge of attacks and has perpetuated the formation of powerful groups such 
as Al-Qaeda and ISIS (General Intelligence and Security Service, 2012). Although 
most nations, organizations, and even independent hacking groups called 
“hacktivists” have considerably increased their attention toward online terrorism, a 
significant amount still needs to be done to gain the upper hand in the online war 
of terror (Ghost Security, 2015). Brantly (2017) notices that a significant challenge 
faced by nation-states and governments lies in the innovation and adaptation of 
extremist groups’ digital security. In this paper, we discuss several methods to 
surveil and fight online terrorism. We identify challenges and promising aspects 
concerning the future of the fight against online terrorism. Finally, we offer a model 
of potential future threat landscapes related to Islamic radicalization in the 
cybersphere.  
Background and Definitions 
Islamic Terrorism Terminology and Definitions 
Terrorism can be defined as the systematic use of violence to achieve 
political objectives. It is a tactical asymmetric fight to compensate for the incapacity 
of the weak to win over a stronger state opponent. Islamic terrorism includes a 
strong religious component derived from an extreme interpretation of the Quran, 
Sharia law, and various Hadiths, in which Islamic supremacy (i.e., establishment of 
a new worldwide Islamic caliphate) is viewed as the ultimate goal.1 This goal is 
attained by conducting a Jihad (literally translated as “struggle” or “striving”), or 
holy war, against unbelievers (kafir). Islamic terrorism takes different forms and 
has multiple roots and origins going as far back as the 11th century CE.  
Historical Review 
To gain support from Arabic movements during World War I and to help 
defeat the Ottoman Empire, France and the United Kingdom promised to support 
the creation of an Arabic state after the war ended. Simultaneously, the British 
government issued the so-called Balfour Declaration supporting the establishment 
of “a national home for Jewish people” in Palestine (Kepel, 2004). After the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire, France and the United Kingdom betrayed their promise by 
secretly agreeing to partition the Arabic territories of the former Ottoman Empire 
under their respective colonial control. The period between World Wars I and II is 
consequentially characterized by the emergence of an Arabic nationalism and 
Islamism as well as by the development of Zionism (via different waves of 








migration of Jewish people in Palestine). After World War II, the important oil 
resources of the region became a major component of the subsequent Cold War 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. The creation of Israel in 1948 
ignited the war between the new Jewish state and its Arabic neighbors in support 
of the Palestinian people. This period was dominated largely by Palestinian 
terrorism.  
An important development is the change of power in Iran in 1979 with the 
arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini. For the first time in the region, an Islamic Shia state 
was created, which introduced a new form of Islamic terrorism against Western 
states. Concurrently, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constituted a turning point 
in the development of modern Islamic terrorism. Weakened by the fall of the Shah 
in Iran, the United States would not allow the creation of a USSR satellite state in 
the region. Together with Saudi Arabia, the United States started supporting 
Muslim opponents and Afghan mujahideen (Islamic fighters) factions. The 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 resulted in the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War. During the following years of civil war in Afghanistan, 
different Islamic groups were trained with the intention of exporting their newly 
gained skills to other parts of the world (notably Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya). 
Not gaining enough recognition, some groups—Al-Qaeda in particular—turned to 
global terrorism, September 11 being the most representative moment of this 
evolution.  
The succeeding “War on Terror” on countries associated with Al-Qaeda, 
along with the killing of Abu Abdallah Usama bin Laden, has reduced the influence 
of this movement but has also given rise to a new and more violent group called 
ISIS/ISIL. In 2014, ISIS/ISIL, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, established a caliphate 
over a significant part of Iraq and Syria. During this period, the Islamic group 
conducted terrorist attacks on numerous countries, particularly in Europe (Paris, 
Brussels, Nice, London, Stockholm, etc.). 
Online Jihad 
The use of the online sphere as a platform for Jihad is endemic to Islamic 
terrorism and has exponentially increased in the past decade (Brantly, 2017). In 
2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri (2nd General Emir of Al-Qaeda) openly denoted the 
media to be an inclusive part of the battlefield (Carter et al., 2014). Terrorist groups 
have successfully learned to use complex online tools that ensure anonymity and 
protection to communicate and coordinate their affairs. We recognize the 
materialization of this development through three main fundamentals: propaganda, 








recruitment, and training. For each of these points, we identify several attack 
vectors exploited by Islamic terrorists, which have contributed to their ascendance 
in the online war of terror.  
Propaganda  
Based on related work, we detect a number of tools used by jihadists as 
means for diffusing motivational material, such as social media, media centers, 
online magazines, and video games. From the infamous video of American hostage 
Nick Berg’s beheading by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004, to the use of social 
media and the creation of online magazines, Islamic extremists have exploited 
many different techniques to rally individuals to their cause. For instance, as 
Pawlak (2015) notes, Al-Qaeda has “openly encouraged cyber Jihad as a sacred 
duty of every Muslim and called upon its followers to hack western websites” (p. 
1). This call has quickly been answered by a prominent British-Islamic figure called 
Abu Hussain al-Britani, also known as “TriCk,” most notorious for hacking Tony 
Blair’s account and joining the ranks of ISIL in 2013. Jihadi groups have quickly 
understood the influence of social media. Platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and 
Instagram have allowed jihadists to share and promote their views. Berger and 
Morgan (2015) estimate that in September 2014, between 46,000 and 70,000 
Twitter accounts were linked to ISIS. Several of these profiles reached thousands 
of followers, one particular example being the ISIS-affiliated Twitter account 
@reyardiraq, with more than 90,000 followers (Brantly, 2017).  
Social media is also used as an outlet for newly emerged centralized media 
centers such as “al-Hayat,” “al-Sahab,” and “al-Furquan.” These media centers 
often exhibit well-edited Islamic propaganda videos, using advanced technological 
cameras and drones to depict often severely contrasted sceneries. For instance, 
amongst the shocking films of beheadings, ISIS has crafted impressive video series 
such as Harvest of the Soldiers, which include almost weekly releases and updates 
of pure military advertising material (Zelin, 2019). The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) 
often contrasts its videos of strength and violence with displays of peace, happiness, 
and prosperity in its controlled cities. ISIS’s efforts to portray a form of utopia to 
undermine the humanitarian crisis occurring in its occupied cities is verified 
through a study led by Tarabay, Shiloach, Weiss, and Gilat (2015), in which the 
authors found that 45% of the Islamic State’s propaganda focuses on its endeavors 
to build and sustain the caliphate by portraying hospitals, charity work, agricultural 
projects, and roadworks.  








Media outlets and forums have also allowed terrorist groups to publish new 
types of propaganda material, such as online magazines and video games (Al-Rawi, 
2016). One of the most notorious examples is Al-Qaeda’s online magazine Inspire, 
thought to be the work of English-speaking jihadi Anwar al-Awlaki, also known as 
the “bin Laden of the Internet” (“Online Preachers,” 2011). Figure 1 depicts 
instructions given in the magazine relating to propaganda and wide distribution of 
the media.  
 
Figure 1. Propaganda message given in the eighth issue of Al-Qaeda’s online 
magazine Inspire (Zelin, 2019). 
 
For the first time, Islamic extremist groups have implemented impressive 
technological tools to modernize their propaganda campaigns. As established in a 
study led by Al-Rawi (2016), groups such as ISIS base most of their marketing 
strategies on emphasizing simple ideological appeals,2 greatly facilitated through 
the use of the cybersphere. Islamic terrorists build their media strategies on three 
main traits, as explained by Haroro J. Ingram (2014): the use of multidimensional 
and multiplatform approaches to instantaneously target individuals and enhance the 
scope and importance of messaging; the organization of narratives and deeds to 
amplify operational and strategic outcomes in the field; and the centrality of the 
Islamic State brand. 
Recruitment 
Patryk Pawlak (2015) notes that “the internet has not only altered traditional 
channels for radicalization and facilitated a two-way communication between 
terrorist organizations and their supporters, but also allowed for a change in 
planning, coordination and execution of attacks” (p. 1). The distribution of 
propaganda through social media is only the first step toward successful 
radicalization and recruitment (Al-Rawi, 2016). Jihadists tend to distrust platforms 
for direct communication and rely on more developed digital operational security 
(OPSEC) techniques to target specific individuals (Brantly, 2017). As soon as the 
first contacts have been made, jihadists rely on mobile messaging applications like 
Viber, Telegram, and Redphone to directly communicate with their potential 








targets. Brantly (2017) observes in his study that high levels of online 
“safeguarding” are required for a potential recruit to make his way into terrorist 
groups. Through the analysis of thousands of posts in forums and social media, 
Brantly establishes a list of communication tools that are either positively or 
negatively regarded by extremists. The list of applications that are considered “safe 
to use” by jihadists includes but is not restricted to Signal, Linphone, Vimeo, Gmail, 
and Telegram. Unsafe tools include Skype, iCloud, and Tor Mail. A strong 
recognition is made on the Silent Phase software, which is often considered to offer 
“secure solutions for voice, browsing and messaging” (p. 91).  
ISIS also regularly uses video games as a measure to radicalize younger 
individuals. Shooting game Arma 3 includes a specific ISIS mod,3 easily accessible 
via online download (Scimeca, 2015). In addition, an adaptation of Grand Theft 
Auto V called “Salil al-Sawarem” (The Clanging of the Swords) was popularized 
in 2014. In this adaptation, the user takes control of a jihadist in his struggle to 
restore the caliphate and combat the infidels. Such means are clearly intended to 
target a younger set of individuals and idealize the daily life of an Islamic fighter. 
Al-Rawi (2016) notes that with high-definition video games and entertaining 
missions, the user is lured into believing that ISIS is a technologically advanced 
group fighting for genuine and authentic beliefs. Finally, ISIS also introduced a 
self-made Android application available for free download on the Google Store. 
“Dawn of the Glad Tidings” was a Twitter-based application that automatically 
posted ISIS-related tweets on the user’s account. Although the lifetime of this 
application was quite limited, Berger and Morgan (2015) and Stern and Berger 
(2016) noted that the application reached a peak of 40,000 tweets a day. 
Training 
Through the expansion of the online sphere, jihadists have rapidly 
discovered that the Internet is not only a place for radicalization, recruitment, and 
propaganda but also for knowledge sharing. In this section, we recognize two main 
attack vectors used by Islamic groups to train recruits in the cybersphere: digital 
protection vectors and military threat vectors. 
Digital Protection Vectors 
 Most of the general techniques required to maintain anonymity and privacy 
over the Internet are not generally known by the average user. Developing some 
techniques to preserve online security requires a minimum amount of training, 








which, as Brantly (2017) notes, is often promoted by social media accounts linked 
to terrorist groups. For instance, the Telegram account @Software_ENG, also 
named Tiqani al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah,4 has been known to post hundreds of 
training documents on forums and websites linked to implementing strong digital 
OPSEC techniques. Another instance is depicted by Mula’ib al-Assina’s response 
to a question related to the use of Skype through Tor on the Minbar forum: “Skype 
is insecure, and Americans are recording every single call since 2008” (Brantly, 
2017, p. 86). It is important to note that most of the material covered and questions 
asked on such platforms are quite trivial and do not dig deep into digital operational 
security. Nevertheless, such activity clearly indicates a high interest and concern 
from jihadists about digital OPSEC and illustrates that the online sphere and 
cybersecurity techniques have become a crucial asset for their operations.  
Military Threat Vectors 
The emergence of certain media outlets and online document-sharing 
platforms has allowed the creation of so-called do-it-yourself terrorism (Pawlak, 
2015). This modern practice of Jihad is most prominently illustrated through online 
journals and magazines released in several volumes by groups such as Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS. Al-Qaeda is one of the first groups to release easy-to-access online 
training documents, like the journal al-Battar,5 which served predominantly as a 
virtual training camp, encouraging weapons of mass destruction and teaching 
explosive handling and kidnapping techniques, amongst many others (Cohen-
Almagor, 2016). A more notorious example of Al-Qaeda’s online training tools 
relates to the 17-volume online magazine Inspire. Inspire became influent 
throughout the world as it was fully aimed at English readership (i.e., Western 
recruits). Studying the influence of Inspire, Lemieux et al. (2014) note that the 
magazine seems to target a “less intellectually engaged audience” around the world, 
particularly in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Lemieux et 
al. (2014) also note that one of the reasons for the magazine’s infamy relates to the 
“Open Source Jihad” section. This section of Inspire covers in great detail a variety 
of skills to learn—from weapon handling to bomb making—and was allegedly used 
by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother, Tamerlan, in the 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombings. Figure 2 illustrates an extract from the step-by-step process of making 
an acetone peroxide bomb in the “Open Source Jihad” section of Inspire’s sixth 
volume. The primary explosive material used in the Paris and Brussels bombings 
was triacetone triperoxide, a trimer form of the mixture of acetone and hydrogen 
peroxide (Alfred, 2016). The aforementioned arguments clearly illustrate the fact 








that today, to pursue Jihad, modern terrorists require only a sufficient Internet 
connection.  
 
Figure 2. Extract from the step-by-step procedure of the making of an acetone 
peroxide bomb. This figure appeared in the sixth issue of Al-Qaeda’s online magazine 
Inspire and was part of the “Open Source Jihad” section (Zelin, 2019). For security 
purposes, the rest of the instructions have been omitted here.   








The Fight against Online Islamic Terrorism 
Since the early 2010s, the threat of online terrorism has become publicly 
acknowledged and many entities have significantly increased their digital 
counterterrorism measures. To analyze the fight against online Islamic terrorism, 
we focus our research on three main actors: governments and international 
organizations, companies, and independent groups. For each of these groups, we 
discuss policies and measures taken to tackle online terrorism. We also consider 
newly emerging groups that have considerably helped nation-states improve their 
trailing position in the online war of terror. 
Governments and International Organizations 
The international coalition against online terrorism is structured around 
three main pillars: “constraining the use of the internet by jihadi organizations,” 
“strengthening de-radicalization efforts,” and “limiting access to funding” (Pawlak, 
2015, p. 2). Nation-states’ efforts to combat online terrorism via several platforms 
have drastically amplified over past years. Initial government responses included 
social media campaigns6 and unsuccessful countermessaging techniques (“Digital 
Counterterrorism,” 2018). Although many of these attempts have been unable to 
compete against the propaganda tactics implemented by jihadists so far, 
international initiatives continue to grow and challenge the spread of online 
terrorism.  
Many nation-states recognized that cutting Islamic extremist groups’ 
financing would ultimately result in those groups’ extinction. This led to the 2015 
UN Resolution 2199, which condemns any form of trade associated with groups 
such as Al-Qaeda (“Unanimously Adopting,” 2015). A few government initiatives 
and offensive responses to Islamic terrorism have proven successful, however. For 
instance, in 2016, the National Security Agency and the United States Cyber 
Command successfully conducted a joint offensive operation called Glowing 
Symphony, with the purpose to disrupt and deny ISIS’s ability to coordinate and 
conduct attacks against the United States and its allies (Martelle, 2018). This 
operation is considered one of the most significant and successful cyber offensive 
operations undertaken by the United States.  
 
 









A most recent initiative, called the Christchurch Call, led by New Zealand’s 
prime minister Jacinda Ardern and French president Emmanuel Macron, aims to 
encourage all major tech companies to eliminate any form of terrorism and violent 
extremist content online (Roy, 2019). Major companies are playing a crucial role 
in the fight against cyber Jihad. As most of the propaganda content flows through 
social media, many of these companies recognize the fight against online 
extremism as a responsibility and a duty. In 2015, Twitter announced the 
suspension of 10,000 ISIS-linked accounts in one day (Gladstone, 2015). Two years 
later, YouTube announced the removal of the lectures and sermons of prominent 
Islamic preacher Anwar al-Awlaki (Wallace & Townsend, 2017). Furthermore, 
Google’s recent Jigsaw Project presents a modern face in combatting Islamic 
propaganda and dismantling extremism networks. This project aims to be “a 
platform for former violent extremists to collaborate, in order to prevent young 
people from joining extremism groups” (“Jigsaw,” n.d). 
Independent Groups 
The rise in online Islamic terrorism has also resulted in the enlisting of 
independent hacking groups, also called hacktivists. Following the Paris Charlie 
Hebdo attacks in 2015, hacktivist group Anonymous publicly declared war on ISIS 
through the #OpISIS campaign and removed 20,000 ISIS-related Twitter accounts 
(Rogers, 2015). Another prominent group engaged in the battle against 
cyberterrorism is Ghost Security Group. To date, Ghost Security Group claims to 
have identified more than 100,000 extremist social media accounts used primarily 
for recruitment, and to monitor more than 200 known violent extremist websites 
(“Ghost Security,” n.d). 
Ways Forward 
Beyond a more stringent international and national legal order and the 
effective involvement of online platforms and social media, the increasing level of 
threat sophistication of the cybersphere and its mastering by terrorist groups require 
constant adaptation. Since the 2013 Snowden leaks, companies have significantly 
increased their use of robust encryption methods in their consumer-communication 
technologies, which has strongly challenged authorities to efficiently track 
terrorists online (“Digital Counterterrorism,” 2018). Brantly (2017) described the 
necessity behind jihadists’ adaptation and innovation on current online 








technologies. Strong digital OPSEC has become a vital need for groups such as Al-
Qaeda and ISIS to exist. It is therefore natural to assume that the future war on 
terror will occur mainly online. Social media and forums are only a small part of 
the danger that Islamic terrorist groups represent, and as technological means 
expand, so does the jihadi threat landscape.  
Recent findings and developments seem to suggest that artificial 
intelligence will become a major asset for tracking, monitoring, and surveilling 
Islamic extremism activities on the Internet. According to a report published by the 
Capgemini Research Institute, 56% of 850 surveyed senior executives in 
cybersecurity claim that their security analysts are overwhelmed by the increasingly 
sophisticated threat levels (Tolido, Van Der Linden, Thieullent, & Frank, 2019). 
The need to further incorporate automation and artificial intelligence as tools for 
detection and response to cyber threats has become crucial. Through the 
development of machine learning and data-mining algorithms, companies and 
public authorities could potentially classify data collected from past attacks to 
model trends that would determine high-risk scenarios and prevent future attacks 
(Beuchelt, 2020). Beuchelt (2020) notes that, “using temporal analytics as well as 
structured and unstructured data analysis and integration, companies can build 
complex social media and other open source intelligence models to predict future 
attacks” (para. 10). Counter Extremism Project’s eGlyph technology and Google’s 
recent Jigsaw Project both illustrate new types of automated mass-tracking 
algorithms, which, if used properly, could lead to astonishing positive results 
(“How CEP’s eGLYPH Technology Works,” 2016). 
Link analysis (defined as a method to evaluate relationships between nodes 
in a network) is an interesting technique used to study information surrounding 
high-stake targets (Carafano, 2005). This method could allow efficient large-scale 
analysis of a suspect’s relationships as well as his or her links to a terrorist 
organization. All of the aforementioned implementations, however, require a 
significant dependence on available and structured data. Although the fields of 
machine learning, data mining, and data analysis are exponentially growing, they 
still face challenges when trying to process natural languages or when manipulating 
nonstructured data such as images, text mixtures, videos, and sensor information 
(Carafano, 2005).  
Online security is often considered a “cat and mouse” game. As security 
strengthens, so do threats and attacks. Although artificial intelligence and data-
analysis algorithms could be used to secure systems and fight online terrorism, 
these techniques could also be used by Islamic terrorists to widen their online range 








and social-engineering techniques. For instance, artificial intelligence could be 
deployed to enhance terrorists’ online propaganda campaigns by implementing an 
algorithm that sends tweets faster and with a higher success rate than a human could 
(Tolido et al., 2019). The need to recognize that the threat vectors of terrorist attacks 
will drastically change in the future is of paramount importance (“Cyberterrorism,” 
2009). Because of the interconnectivity revolution of the past few decades, critical 
infrastructures such as hospitals, power plants (specifically nuclear plants), 
transportation infrastructures, and banks are prone to becoming terrorists’ next 
targets of value. There is no definite answer to ensure protection against terrorist 
threats in the cybersphere, but cooperation and intelligence sharing will be critical 
for the containment of such threats (Collins, n.d).   
The need for public and law enforcement authorities to design adequate and 
reactive cross-border cooperation tools has been highlighted by the European 
Union after the series of terrorist attacks that hit a number of its member states in 
2015 and 2016. In September 2018, the European Commission adopted a legislative 
proposal on “preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online” (European 
Commission, 2018). The regulation introduces a removal order that can be issued 
as an administrative or judicial decision by a competent authority in a member state. 
In such cases, the hosting service provider is obliged to remove the content or to 
disable access to the content within one hour. The regulation requires hosting 
service providers, where appropriate, to take proactive measures proportionate to 
the level of risk and to remove terrorist material from their services, including 
through the deployment of automated detection tools. Failure to act within an hour 
after a removal order has been placed by a member state could result in fines of up 
to 4% of the hosting service provider’s annual revenue (“European Parliament,” 
2019).  
Opponents of this proposal—such as Tim Berners-Lee, founder of the 
World Wide Web—claim that the proposed regulation is an attack on freedom of 
speech and would impair the Internet in Europe without strengthening the fight 
against online terrorism (Baker, Berners-Lee & Cerf, 2019). The proposal is still in 
discussion between the European Union’s colegislators because of concerns 
expressed by the European Parliament about possible abuses of removal orders and 
restriction of freedom of speech (Creighton, 2019).  
Despite these criticisms, adoption of the regulation could represent a major 
milestone in the fight against online Islamic terrorism. Lucinda Creighton (2019), 
Senior Advisor at the Counter Extremism Project, explained: “Of the 1.5 million 
videos of the attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, that were detected and 








eventually removed by Facebook, only 1.2 million were screened and blocked by 
Facebook’s software before being uploaded. This left 300,000 videos uploaded to 
the platform for users to see” (para. 2). 
The way companies and public authorities shape new regulations and 
approach technical advancements will undoubtedly be crucial for the future of 
online counterterrorism. Collins (n.d) argues that the way we approach online 
counterterrorism must change, as we need to adapt to new rules, new technologies, 
and new players. Ultimately, technical developments and legal frameworks will 
need to properly balance public security needs with freedom of speech and 
individual data-protection requirements. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have provided a cohesive narrative of the way Islamic 
terrorists use the cybersphere to conduct their Jihad and how nation-states have 
reacted to the threat posed by such groups. We have selectively reviewed online 
methods used by Islamic groups in the “Online Jihad” section by analyzing three 
key components to their success—namely propaganda, recruitment, and training. 
Our analysis illustrates that Islamic terrorist groups’ influence over the cybersphere 
is as significant as it has ever been and has undeniably led to major attacks over the 
past decade. Our findings also indicate that Islamic groups were evidently leading 
the online war of terror over the past few years as most nation-states failed to 
recognize the online threat that Islamic extremism represents. 
We then focused our study on ways in which the fight against online 
terrorism is conducted, in the section called “The Fight against Online Islamic 
Terrorism,” by identifying three major attack vectors: governments and 
international organizations, companies, and independent groups. Our findings 
suggest that international response to online jihadism has significantly increased 
over the past decade, considerably decreasing the gap between nation-states and 
terrorist groups in the cybersphere.  
Finally, we have identified, in the section “Ways Forward,” several 
challenges and threats that online terrorism will pose in the future. Although 
findings and newly built tools to counter online terrorism offer reason for optimism, 
new threats emerge at a similar rate through the expansion of technological 
advancement. Future work will have to efficiently recognize the importance of 
cybersecurity related to the online war of terror and the impact that neglecting it 
has had on the world. Containing online resources that advance terrorism is an 








increasingly critical task, since a simple video, a brief message, or a single tweet 
could represent an individual’s turning point between peace and terrorism.  
Notes 
1 It is important to note that Islamic terrorism is based on a radical interpretation of 
the Quran that is, in general, not representative of the Islamic religion. The term 
“Islamic terrorism” is highly politicized and should by no means serve as a 
reference to Islamic tradition. It is used throughout this article exclusively as a 
means to describe violent groups who claim religious motivations behind their 
attacks.  
2 One example includes the use of a black banner. The black banner contains many 
different Islamic references. For instance, it is assumed that a black banner was 
used when Abu Muslim led the Abbasid Revolution in 747 CE. 
3 Video game mods are defined as “short modifications” of the game by external 
parties such as fans or players. 
4 Also known as Islamic State Tech. 
5 Also known as The Sharp-Edged Sword. 
6 One notable example relates to the “Think Again Turn Away” social media 
campaign, launched by the US Department of State, which accumulated a modest 
44,000 followers on Twitter and Facebook combined (General Intelligence and 
Security Service, 2012). 
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